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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT 
GRAHAM, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals No. 910418CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that 
the Utah Dram Shop Act (Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended)) applies only to commercial hosts in a 
commercial setting and does not apply to a social host supplying 
alcoholic beverages in a social setting? 
Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend Complaint by ruling there is no common law action in 
favor of an injured person against an individual supplier of 
alcohol? 
OPINION BELOW 
The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed 
is Sneddon v. Wenkel, 175 Utah Adv. Reports 13(CA, 11-25-91). 
JURISDICTION 
On November 25, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued its 
decision affirming the trial court's summary judgment against 
her. Petitioner Sneddon timely filed and was granted an 
extension of time in which to file this petition by the Utah 
Supreme Court on December 26, 1991. This Court has jurisdiction 
to consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §21-2-
2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991) and §78-2a-4 (1986). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rules 15 and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). A 
reproduction of the entire statute and applicable rules is 
contained in the addendum hereto. To the extent petitioner 
relies on any other statutes or rules, the same are included in 
the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court 
of Weber County, wherein the court granted defendant Graham's 
Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that the Utah Dram Shop Act 
as contained in Section 32A-14-1 does not apply in a social 
setting, and was intended to apply only to the commercial sale 
of alcoholic beverages. (R. 175). The summary judgment was 
entered on September 28, 1989. On November 21, 1989, the 
plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint seeking to add 
a common law negligence action against defendant Graham. The 
case against co-defendant Wenkel was still pending at the time 
plaintiff moved to amend her complaint. (R. 181). 
The summary judgment in favor of the defendant Graham did 
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not become a final order of the court until the court entered its 
order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint on April 16, 
1990. In fact, an appeal of the court's summary judgment was 
initially filed on October 25, 1989. (R. 177). On December 20, 
1989, defendant moved the Supreme Court for an order dismissing 
the appeal for the reason that the action against co-defendant, 
Wenkel, was still pending at the time of the initial appeal. (R. 
211-213, 218-219). Subsequent to the October 25, 1989, Notice 
of Appeal, the Supreme Court, on stipulation of counsel, remanded 
the appeal to the trial court for the purpose of deciding the 
Plaintiff's pending Motion to Amend Complaint in order to obtain 
a final order from the trial court. (R. 218). During the above-
described sequence of procedural events, the case against co-
defendant, Wenkel, had been settled, but was not dismissed by the 
trial court until February 14„ 1990, pursuant to stipulation of 
counsel. (R. 237-239). 
The matter was orally argued to the Court of Appeals on 
October 25, 1991. On November 25, 1991, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's grant of Graham's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the denial of Sneddon's motion to amend her 
complaint. Graham, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. at p.16. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arose out of an automobile accident occurring on 
April 26, 1986, wherein the plaintiff was injured as a result of 
defendant Graham's vehicle colliding with her vehicle while the 
plaintiff was parked in her own driveway. 
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Defendants Graham and Wenkel, worked together at Hill Air 
Force Base and on the night in question stopped at a local 
convenience store on their way to Graham's home where each 
purchased his favorite brand of beer. At Graham's home, Wenkel 
consumed the twelve (12) beers he had purchased, as they drank 
through the night. (Graham depo. 3-1-89, p.21, 11. 8-9). Graham 
also supplied Wenkel more beer which Wenkel proceeded to consume 
while at Graham's home. (Wenkel depo. 8-3-88, p.4, 11. 5-7). 
Graham understood Wenkel had previously been picked up for DUI 
(Graham depo. 3-1-89, p. 10, 11. 19). Further, Graham had seen 
Wenkel intoxicated a number of times before the accident at 
issue. (IcL, p. 34, 11. 19-23). When Wenkel decided to leave 
Graham's home and drive to his own residence, Graham expressed 
concern because Wenkel had been drinking all night, (_Id., p.26, 
11. 20-22) but did nothing to effectively stop him from driving 
his car. 
At approximately 8:00 a.m. the following morning, after 
having drank throughout the night and early morning, Wenkel left 
the Graham home to drive to his own residence. (Graham depo. 3-
1-89, p.29, 11. 4-6). In route, Wenkel lost control of his 
vehicle and jumped the curb near the plaintiff's home, crashing 
into the plaintiff while the plaintiff was seated in a vehicle 
in her own driveway. Wenkel's blood alcohol content at the time 
of the accident was .19% by weight. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BROAD LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT 
CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE ACT IS INTENDED TO APPLY 
TO SOCIAL HOSTS 
Utah's original Dram Shop Act, formerly 32-11-1, Utah Code 
Annotated (1981), provided: 
[A]ny person who gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides intoxicating liquor to another contrary 
to . . . Section 32-7-14 or Section 32-7-24(b) 
or (c), and thereby causes the intoxication of 
another person, is liable for injuries in 
person, property, or means of support to any 
third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of 
that third person, resulting from the 
intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to 
in subsection (1) of this section shall have a 
cause of action against the intoxicated person 
and the person who provided the intoxicating 
liquor in violation of subsection (1) above or 
either of them. 
At the time the original dram shop statute was enacted, 
Section 32-7-14 provided that: 
no person shall sell or supply any alcoholic 
beverage or permit alcoholic beverages to be 
sold or supplied to any person under or 
apparently under the influence of alcohol, 
Utah Code Annotated (1943) (repealed 1985) (Emphasis added). 
Section 32-7-24 provided that: 
no person shall: (a) permit drunkenness to take 
place in any house or on any premises of which 
he is the owner, tenant, or occupant; or (b) 
permit or suffer any person apparently under the 
influence of liquor to consume any liquor in any 
house or on any premises of which the first 
named person is the owner, tenant, or occupant; 
or (c) give any liquor to any person apparently 
under the influence of liquor. 
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Utah Code Annotated §32-7-24 (1943) (repealed 1985) (Emphasis 
added). 
The obvious intent of the original Dram Shop Act (Section 
32-11-1, Utah Code Annotated) was to regulate not only the sale 
and distribution, but the possession and use of alcohol in a 
social setting, including within private residences. 
The Dram Shop Act, relevant in this case, uses essentially 
the same language as the original 1981 Act when imposing 
liability upon individuals who violate the provisions of the act. 
Rather than refer specifically to other statutory references, 
such as the former Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24, the statute in 
effect at the time of the court's summary judgment provided: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location 
allowing consumption on the premises, any 
alcoholic beverage, to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of twenty-
one (21) years, or 
(b) who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs, or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the 
alcoholic beverage knew or should have 
known from the circumstances was under 
the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs, or 
(d) who is a known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the 
intoxication of that person, is liable 
for injuries in person, property, or 
means of support to any third person, 
or to the spouse, child, or parent 
of that third person resulting from 
the intoxication. An employer is 
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liable for the actions of its 
employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under 
subsection (1) has a cause of action against the 
person who provided the liquor or alcoholic 
beverage in violation of subsection (1). 
(Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1986) (Emphasis added). 
The 1990 statute is virtually the same as the 1986 act, and 
continues to provide liability to any person providing liquor or 
alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons. (Compare Section 32-
11-1; Section 32A-14-1, 1986 amendment; 32A-14-101, 1990 
amendment). The amendment broadening the definition of 
intoxicating liquor to include "any alcoholic beverage" was 
effective on March 17, 1986, more than thirty (30) days before 
the April 26, 1986, accident giving rise to this law suit. The 
general intent of the Dram Shop Act is further supported by 
Section 32A-12-205, Utah Code Annotated (1990) which prohibits 
the furnishing or supplying of alcoholic beverages to any 
interdicted person. Former Section 32A-12-10 stated: 
(1) No person shall sell, offer to sell, or 
otherwise furnish or supply, any alcoholic 
.beverage or product to any known interdicted 
person. . . 
Section 32A-12-10, Utah Code Annotated 1985). See Also: Coffman 
v. Kennedy, (1977, 1st Dist. ) 74 Col. App. 3d 28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 
267, citing with approval Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha 
Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971). 
In Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 34, 763 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1988), this court held that "where statutory language is 
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plain and unambiguous, this court will not look beyond to define 
legislative intent." The Allisen court cited Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988), in ruling that 
the Supreme Court is guided by the rule that a statute should be 
construed according to its. plain language, Allisen at 809. 
In construing the plain language of the 1986 Dram Shop Act 
in effect at the time of the accident giving rise to the present 
case, it is clear that the Act did not limit its application to 
the commercial setting. The plain language of the statute 
provided: 
Any person who directly gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location 
allowing consumption on the premises, any 
alcoholic beverage, to a person [in violation of 
the statute] and by those actions causes the 
intoxication of that person, is liable for 
injuries . . . to any third person 
resulting from the intoxication. 
Section 32-14-1 Utah Code Ann. 1986 amend. (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, the "any person" language of the statute is plain 
and unambiguous and must be construed to apply to the social, as 
well as, the commercial setting. With this, the Court of Appeals 
apparently agrees. Sneddon v. Graham, 175 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 13, 15. 
Had the legislature intended that the statute only apply to the 
commercial setting, the plain language of the statute should have 
excluded the term "any person" and included terms such as "seller", 
"commercial distributor or provider", "tavern", or such other terms 
strictly designed to limit the application of the act to the 
commercial setting. 
It is also clear that a "person" may be held liable under 
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the Act for providing either "liquor" or "alcoholic beverages", the 
latter including beer which was the drink served by Graham to 
Wenkel under the facts of this case. 
This court has previously held that the best indicator of 
legislative intent is the statute's plain language, and that in the 
absence of ambiguity there is nothing to construe. See Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Archiletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974). Clearly, there is 
nothing ambiguous in the language of the 1986 Dram Shop Act. The 
Act must, therefore, be broadly construed to include social hosts 
as well as commercial providers of alcohol. 
POINT II 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE FOUND LIABILITY FOR SOCIAL 
HOSTS UNDER SIMILAR DRAM SHOP ACTS 
In Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (1972 Iowa), 
overruled on other grounds; Lewis v. State of Iowa, 256 N.W. 181, 
(1977 Iowa), the Iowa Supreme Court refused to hold that the Iowa 
Dram Shop Act applied only to those engaged in liquor traffic or 
sales. The court ruled that such statutes were remedial or 
compensatory in nature and, therefore, refused to adopt rules of 
strict construction which would limit the statute's scope and 
thus impair the remedy and advance the mischief sought to be 
corrected. 
Other jurisdictions whose Dram Shop Acts contain similar 
language to that contained in the Utah statute have ruled that 
dram shop liability extends to the social host. In Martin v. 
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Watts, 508 S.2d 1136 (1987 Alabama), the Alabama Supreme Court 
held that a statute which granted a person injured by an 
intoxicated person a right of action against the person who 
provided the intoxicant in violation of state law provided a 
cause of action against the social host for injuries received as 
a result of an automobile accident. The court rejected the 
social host's contentions that the statute applied only to 
commercial dispensers of alcohol since the statute included the 
terms "giving" and "otherwise disposing of." The court further 
held that it was hard to imagine a phrase more expansive than 
"otherwise disposing of". Neither was the court persuaded that 
the title of the act ("Illegal Liquor Sales") discounted its 
application to social hosts. Id. at p. 1141. 
The Martin court also noted that the trend in recent 
decisions of other jurisdictions was to allow causes of action 
where adults had assisted in furnishing alcoholic beverages to 
minors. Id. at 1141. In Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P. 2d 133 
(Utah 1978), this court recognized the possibility of a common 
law negligence action in the form of contribution between a beer 
retailer and minor motorist for claims arising from an automobile 
accident and resulting injury to third parties. See also: In 
Re Chiverton, 469 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. App. 1991); Sutter v. 
Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716 (Ga 1985); Fassett v. Betta Kappa 
Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986, Penn); Koback v. Crook, 366 
N.W.2d 857 (1985). This same rationale justifies application of 
the Utah Dram Shop Act to social hosts, given the similarity of 
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the terminology since the Utah Act imposes liability on any 
person who "gives" or "otherwise provides" alcohol in violation 
of the statute. 
POINT III 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF UTAH'S 
DRAM SHOP ACT TO SOCIAL HOSTS 
The clear intent of Dram Shop liability is twofold: (1) 
provide a remedy to innocent third persons who suffer injury as 
a result of the misuse and abuse of alcohol, and (2) impose some 
responsibility on those persons who provide alcohol to 
individuals in violation of the statute. To say that social 
hosts should not be held liable for irresponsibly providing 
alcohol to guests whom they know, or should know, are under the 
influence of alcohol is to completely disregard the remedial 
nature of the statute. 
A number of courts have held that social hosts who serve 
liquor to social guests are liable for resulting injuries to 
third parties because of the guests' intoxication. In Kelly v. 
Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (NJ 1984), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is society where thousands of deaths are 
caused each year by drunken drivers, where the 
damage caused by such deaths is regarded 
increasingly as intolerable, where liquor 
licensees are prohibited from serving 
intoxicated adults, and where long-standing 
criminal sanctions against drunken driving have 
recently been significantly strengthened to the 
point where the Governor notes that they are 
regarded as the toughest in the nation, See 
Governor's Annual Message to the N.J. State 
Legislature, Jan. 10, 1984. The imposition of 
such a duty by the judiciary seems both fair and 
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fully in accord with the State's policy. Unlike 
those cases in which the definition of desirable 
policy is the subject of intense controversy, 
here the imposition of a duty is both consistent 
with and supportive of social goal - the 
reduction of drunken driving - that is 
practically unanimously accepted by society. 
Id. at p.1222. 
In Gwinnell, the New Jersey court found that a host who 
serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the 
guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating an 
automobile, is liable for the subsequent injuries of a third 
party as a result of the negligent operation of the car by the 
adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication. 
The profound truth enunciated in Gwinnell cannot be 
disregarded by this Court. No justifiable reason for limiting 
Utah's Dram Shop Act to not include the homeowner or social guest 
can be made. To argue that the act should impose liability only 
on licensees who derive a profit from serving liquor is to ignore 
the entire purpose behind the act. Simply stated, liability 
proceeds from the duty of care that relates to control of the 
liquor supply. Arguments concerning "profits" to tavern or bar 
owners simply jump this analysis. 
It is much easier to correctly read Utah's Dram Shop Act as 
requiring a social host to take the relatively small task upon 
him of supervising his intoxicated guests than for the public to 
deal with the serious injury or death which results when the 
actions of the social host are not liable under the statute. 
And, what difference is there between a person's liability under 
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auto insurance for lending his car to an intoxicated person? The 
theory behind both the car owner and the social host is the same, 
and the public will benefit greatly by this application. Surely 
the financial impact of a homeowner's increased insurance is far 
less valuable than the incredible loss suffered by Utah residents 
as a result of drunk driving. As concluded by the Gwinnell 
court: 
. the adjustments in social behavior at 
parties, the burden put on the host to 
reasonably oversee the serving of liquor, the 
burden on the guest to make sure if one is 
drinking that another is driving, and the burden 
on all to take those reasonable steps even if, 
on* some occasion, some guests may become 
belligerent: those social dislocations, their 
importance, must be measured against the misery, 
death, and destruction caused by the drunken 
driver. Does our society morally approve of the 
decision to continue to allow the charm of 
unrestrained social drinking when the cost is 
the lives of others, sometimes of the guests 
themselves? 
Id. at p. 1229. Utah's Dram Shop Act must be correctly read to 
adequately protect the citizens of this state from drunk drivers, 
no matter who provided them with their alcoholic beverages. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO ADD A COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
a party may amend his pleading only upon obtaining leave of the 
court or by written consent of the adverse party. Rule 15 
further provides that "leave shall be freely given when justice 
so requires." The Court of Appeals found that the trial court 
had jurisdiction to rule on Sneddon's motion to amend her 
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complaint. Sneddon v. Graham, supra, at p.16. Plaintiff's 
initial appeal was remanded to the district court for purposes 
of deciding plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. The court 
issued its order denying plaintiff's motion ruling that "if it 
is deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to 
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that 
there is not a common law cause of action running in favor of a 
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol . . .". 
(R. 249). While the trial court's order denying plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Complaint is less than clear, it appears on its 
face that the trial court denied plaintiff's motion because the 
court was of the opinion there is no common law action in favor 
of a injured person against a third party supplier of alcohol. 
In considering motions to amend pleadings, this court has 
ruled that determining factors include: (1) lack of prejudice 
to either party; and (2) whether the amendments were attempted 
prior to trial. Lewis v. Maul tree, 627 P. 2d 94 (Utah 1981). 
Given the procedural posture of the case at the time plaintiff 
moved to amend, there would have been no prejudice to the 
defendants in allowing the amendment since the case had not yet 
gone to trial. In addition, Graham cannot claim prejudice or 
surprise in Sneddon's seeking to hold him liable under a common 
law negligence theory since Graham's actions allowing Wenkel to 
become intoxicated at his home and further allowing him to drive 
his automobile when he left Graham's residence has been the crux 
of Sneddon's complaint since the beginning of this lawsuit. This 
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being the case, there is no procedural reason upon which the 
court's denial of plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint may be 
based. 
Since there is no procedural basis for the denial of 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, it« must be assumed that 
the court has denied the plaintiff's Motion to Amend by ruling 
as a matter of law that there is no common law cause of action 
in favor of an injured person against a third party supplier of 
alcohol. Contrary to the trial court's finding, a common law 
action for negligent serving of alcohol is recognized in many 
states, arguably including Utah. 
In Albertson's, supra, this court found that a grocery 
outlet which sold beer to a certain minor may be liable for 
subsequent injuries to third parties involved in an automobile 
accident with the minor when the retailer reasonably should have 
foreseen the likelihood of the beer sale being combined with an 
accident and resulting injuries. Although not recognized by the 
court of appeals in its review of this case, Rees v. Albertson's 
arguably creates a special relationship between retailers and 
third parties injured by drunken drivers, thus creating the 
necessary "duty" for liability to be found under Utah's adoption 
of §315 of the Restatement of Torts (Second). The analogy in 
Rees would arguably also apply to the social host who serves 
alcohol to an intoxicated guest resulting in injuries to a third 
party. 
In McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141 
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(Mass. 1986), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a social 
host could be held liable on common-law grounds to a person 
injured by an intoxicated guest's negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle where a host knew or should have known that his guest was 
drunk. Likewise, in Kelly v. Gwinnell, supra, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled that a social host has a duty to the public 
not to create a foreseeable and unreasonable risk by providing 
alcohol to intoxicated guests, and that if he choses to do so, 
he will be held liable in a negligence action for injuries 
suffered by a third party as a result of the intoxicated guestrs 
negligent driving. In Solberg v. Johnson, 760 P. 2d 867 (Or. 
1988), a tavern owner who had settled claims brought against him 
by a person injured in an automobile accident successfully 
brought a third-party action for contribution against the 
motorist's "social hosts". The Oregon Supreme Court based its 
reasoning, in part, on the knowledge of the hosts as to the 
motorist's drinking problem and their continuance in serving 
alcoholic beverages to him once he was visibly intoxicated. 
See also: Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (NJ 1984); Pike 
v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. App. 1968); Rappaport v. Nichols, 
156 A.2d 1 (NJ 1959); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 18, 
(Mass. 1967); Calligan v. Cousar, 187 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1963). 
While the Utah Supreme Court has expressly refused to rule 
whether there is a common law action for the negligent supply of 
liquor, the modern trend and public policy suggests that an 
action ought to be recognized. Allisen v. American Legion Post 
16 
No. 134, supra; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., supra. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of the Dram Shop 
Actfs application to social hosts. Plaintiff further requests 
that this Court reverse the Court of Appealf s ruling denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to allow plaintiff to add 
a common law negligence cause of action against defendant Graham. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^X ^L^ day of January, 1992. 
WARD 
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
ffi day of January, 1992, to Paul N. Belnap and Brett G. 
Pearce, attorneys for defendant Graham, at Strong & Hanni, Sixth 
Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
£JZ niuj^Q 
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW 
:torneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Section 32A-14-101, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Court of Appeals Decision 
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32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action — 
Statute of limitations — Employee protections. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the 
following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, 
is liable for iryuries in person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from 
the intoxication: 
(a) any person under the age of 21 years; 
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; 
(c) any .person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage 
knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or 
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person. 
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's es-
tate. 
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursu-
ant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is 
limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all 
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be 
commenced within two years after the date of the injury. 
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon 
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise 
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a 
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judg-
ment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee 
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection 
(1). :• 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on 
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated 
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set 
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989, 
ch. 240, $ 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch- 23, 
* 178. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1989 amend* 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec-
tion (7) and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1990 amendment, effective February 21, 
1990, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as $ 32A-14-1; transferred the Ian* 
guage after Nto the following persons" at the 
end of the introductory paragraph in Subsec-
tion (1) from Subsection (l)(d); designated the 
former final sentence in Subsection (lXd) as 
present Subsection (2); designated former Sub-
sections (2) to (7) as present Subsections (3) to 
(8); deleted "liquor or other" before "alcoholic 
beverage" in present Subsection (3); substi-
tuted "July I, 1985" for "the effective date of 
this subsection" in present Subsection (5); de-
leted "which arises after the effective date of 
this subsection" after "chapter" in present Sub-
section (6); substituted "airport lounge, private 
club, on-premise beer retailer, or any other es-
tablishment" for "club, or any other facility" in 
present Subsection (8)(a); and made changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale 
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages — 
Injured person's cause of action against intoxi-
cated person or persons who provided alco-
holic beverage — Survival of action. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or 
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, 
to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or 
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for 
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to 
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxica-
tion. An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of 
this chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic bever-
age m violation of Subsection (U. 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the 
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that 
person's estate. 
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person 
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the 
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate 
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one 
occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which 
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within 
two years after the date of the injury. 
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the iiyury. 
History: C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective March 17, 1986, added the 
language in Subsection (1) following "or oth-
erwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a) 
through (l)(d), the last sentence in Subsec-
tion (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); in-
serted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the 
beginning; in Subsection (2), inserted "or 
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor 
stylistic changes. 
Compder's Notes. — The phrase "effec-
tive date of this subsection," referred to in 
Subsections (4) and (5), appears in Laws 
1986, ch. 177, § 3, which became effective 
March 17,1986. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the x:ourt may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the tfourt that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of ail the parties. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WENKEL and 
ROBERT GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
\ 
\ 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 870999559 
The parties agree that for purposes of this motion, the 
conduct complained of arose in a social as opposed to a 
commercial setting. 
The Court is persuaded that the statute in question is 
not intended to apply in a social, setting and accordingly grants 
defendant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this J() day of September, 1989, 
RULING 
Sneddon v. Wenkel et al 
Case No. 870999559 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the sdstt- day of September, 
1989 I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to 
counsel as follows: 
Erik M. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 Twenty Fifth ^Street 
Ogden# Utah 84401 
Lynn S. Davies 
Attorney for Defendant Wenkel 
Key Bank Tower Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Paul M. Belnap 
Attorney for Defendant Graham 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT 
GRAHAM, 
Defendants. 
— — — — — — — in — — — i ' • 
i SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 99559 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the 
defendant Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court 
having reviewed the memoranda submitted in support of the motion 
and in opposition to the motion, and having issued its Memorandum 
Decision determining that the statutes in question were not 
intended to apply in a social setting as found in this case, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant 
Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that 
the plaintiff's complaint against Robert Graham is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant Graham. 
DATED t h i s j5 day of Afp^kD-a flfJLA^ , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
ME Stanton M. Taylor 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this^JT^T day of /y-/^Hf^/_ / 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing summary Judgment 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Erik M. Ward 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
P. 0. BOX 1850 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Lynn s. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, seventh Floor 
50 South Main street 
P-. o. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
^^7n 
i/ v <y v 
fry* 
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
Brett G. Pearce, #5220 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Robert Graham 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT 
GRAHAM, i 
Defendants. ] 
i ORDER 
Civil No. 870999559 
Judge Stanton Taylor 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 12th 
day of March, 1990, at the hour of 10:45 A.M. before the 
Honorable Stanton Taylor, District Court Judge, on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Complaint. 
The plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record 
and defendant Robert Graham was represented by his counsel of 
record. 
The court having previously granted Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and having entered its Summary Judgment 
dated November 3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff 
with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint 
to "add a cause of action against the defendant, Robert Graham, 
based upon a theory of common law negligence in supplying 
intoxicating liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel." 
A proposed amended complaint was not presented with the 
motion, but counsel for plaintiff presented argument as to the 
basis for the amended complaint. 
Having reviewed the motion, and the memorandum in 
opposition to the same, and having heard the argument of counsel 
together with the procedural posture of the case, with the court 
having previously dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and the 
court having indicated at the time of the hearing that if it is 
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to 
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that 
there is not a common law cause of action tunning in favor of a 
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol, nor does 
the court believe that the provisions of Utahfs Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act afford to the plaintiff a cause of action 
under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
-2-
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is denied/. 
DATED this LI day of , 1990. 
District /Sour" 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 3c^ day of /?lJ./,sJi^ , 
1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Erik M. Ward 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84110 
<*. 
3 
CODE • co Sneddon 
Provo, Utah 175 Uuh_ 
Ote as 
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENCHMARK, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
SALT LAKE VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH 
BOARD, INC., a Utah corporation, and Sail 
Lake County, a political entity, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 910393 
FILED: December 13, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
ATTORNEYS: 
Thomas T. Billings, David L. Arrington, 
Bryon J. Benevento, Kathryn D. Kendell, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
Joseph C. Rust, John M. Wunderli, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appell-
ants' motion for summary disposition purs-
uant to rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The motion to reverse is granted, 
and the case is remanded for trial on the 
merits. 
Plaintiff was the landlord ("Landlord"), and 
defendant Salt Lake Valley Mental Health 
Board, assignee of Salt Lake County, was the 
tenant ("Tenant") of a commercial building 
located in Salt Lake City. The lease was for a 
term of five years, but provided that Tenant 
could terminate the lease in advance of the 
expiration date by giving six months' notice to 
Landlord. Tenant agreed to pay a portion of 
the costs of remodeling the space, not excee-
ding $40,000, if it exercised the option to ter-
minate before the expiration of the lease. On 
October 31, 1989, Tenant notified Landlord 
that it would vacate the premises on January 
1, 1990, and terminate the lease. Because its 
new facility was not ready in January, Tenant 
actually stayed until February 1,1990. 
Landlord brought this action alleging breach 
of the lease and demanding as damages all of 
the monthly rentals for the three years rema-
ining in the lease. Tenant counterclaimed, 
alleging that it was constructively evicted 
because of Landlord's failure to make repairs 
and perform maintenance work as agreed 
under the lease. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to Landlord, ruling that 
v. Graham
 t~ 
Adv. Rep. 13 LJ 
Tenant breached the lease by failing to give 
notice of termination of the lease six months 
before moving out. 
On its motion for summary disposition, 
Tenant first argues that the trial court manif-
estly erred in granting summary judgment, as 
genuine disputes of material fact are still at 
issue. Factual issues exist with respect to 
whether Landlord or Tenant breached the 
lease and whether Landlord constructively 
evicted Tenant by failing to make the building 
habitable for Tenant's employees and clients. 
Tenant also argues that the award of damages 
is manifestly erroneous since Tenant gave 
notice of termination of the lease and should 
pay only the six monthly rentals for the notice 
term plus the $40,000 limit for remodeling. 
We agree that there are issues of fact to be 
adjudicated on the first of these points. As for 
the second, the measure of damages, we agree 
with Tenant that the rents due could not 
exceed six months' rent, plus remodeling 
expenses in an amount not to exceed $40,000. 
We remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Cite as 
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Robyn Lynn SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Robert GRAHAM and John Wenkel, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
No. 910418-CA 
FILED: November 25, 1991 
Second District, Weber County 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor 
ATTORNEYS: 
Erik M. Ward and Robert K. Hunt, Ogden, 
for Appellant 
Paul M. Belnap and Lynn S. Davies, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
OPINION 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant Robyn Lynn Sneddon appeals 
from the trial court's grant of appellee Robert 
Graham's motion for summary judgment, and 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
v. Graham 
Adv. Rep. 13 
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the trial court's denial of her motion to 
amend her complaint. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
This case arose out of an automobile acci-
dent which occurred on April 25, 1986, where 
Sneddon was injured when the automobile 
operated by John Wenkei collided with 
Sneddon's vehicle. Graham and Wenkei had 
each purchased approximately a six-pack of 
beer on their way home from work on April 
24, the night before the accident. At 
Graham's home, Graham and Wenkei cons-
umed the beer that had been purchased. Alt-
hough the facts are in dispute as to who drank 
which beer, for purposes of this appeal, the 
parties agree that Wenkei consumed the six 
cans of beer he had purchased, and consumed 
two of the beers that Graham had purchased. 
The following morning Wenkei left Graham's 
home and collided with Sneddon's vehicle, 
which was parked in her driveway. 
Sneddon filed her original complaint naming 
only Wenkei as defendant in June of 1987. In 
March of 1988, Sneddon added Graham as a 
codefendant, claiming that under Utah's 
Dramshop law, he knew or should have 
known that Wenkei was under the influence of 
alcohol and was negligent in letting him drive 
in that condition. Graham filed a motion for 
summary judgment which the trial court 
granted on November 3, 1989. The order dis-
missed all claims against Graham, with prej-
udice. In late November, Sneddon filed a 
motion to amend her complaint to add a 
common law negligence claim against Graham, 
and also filed a notice of appeal of the 
summary judgment in favor of Graham. 
Graham moved the supreme court to dismiss 
Sneddon's appeal because there were still 
claims pending against Wenkei, and therefore, 
there was no final order from which Sneddon 
could appeal. In December, the parties stipu-
lated to a remand of the appeal to the trial 
court to obtain a final order, and the supreme 
court granted the motion to dismiss the pre-
mature appeal in January 1990. 
The trial court denied Sneddon's motion to 
amend her complaint, stating that it lacked 
jurisdiction. No final order denying this 
motion was signed. In January of 1990, 
Sneddon again moved the trial court to allow 
her to amend her complaint to add a common 
law negligence action against Graham. Prior 
to the court ruling on this motion, Sneddon 
and Wenkei reached a settlement agreement 
and all claims against Wenkei were dismissed 
on February 14, 1990. The trial court then 
denied Sneddon's second motion to amend 
her complaint and a final order denying the 
motion was entered in April 1990. 
Sneddon appeals the trial court's summary 
judgment against her, claiming that, contrary 
to the trial court's legal conclusion, Utah's 
Dramshop law, Utah Code Ann. §32A-14-
UTAH ADVAi 
1 (1986), applies in a social setting. Sneddon 
also appeals the trial court's denial of her 
motion to amend her complaint, claiming that 
such an amendment would not have prejud-
iced Graham, and that a common law action 
of negligence under these circumstances should 
be recognized in this state. 
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY 
In reviewing the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, we must construe facts in 
a light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion. Sikox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 
814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Summary judgment can [only] be granted 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists, 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Id. at 623 (citations 
omitted). "Because the trial court's ruling on 
the meaning of a statute presents a question of 
law, we review it for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion." Tan-
ner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court granted 
Graham's motion for summary judgment, 
stating that Utah Code Ann. §32A-14-1 
(1986) was not intended to apply in a social, 
as opposed to commercial, setting. Chapter 14 
of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act 
(hereinafter the Dramshop Act) establishes 
liability for injuries resulting from the intoxi-
cation of an individual. It states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Any person who directly 
gives, sells, or otherwise provides 
liquor, or at- a location allowing 
consumption on the premises, any 
alcoholic beverage, to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 
years or 
(b) who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(c) whom the person furnishing 
the alcoholic beverage knew or 
should have known from the circ-
umstances was under the influence 
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages 
or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known interdicted 
person,... 
is liable for injuries in person, 
property, or means of support to 
any third person, or to the spouse, 
child, or parent of that third 
person, resulting from the intoxic-
ation. 
Utah Code Ann . §32A-14-1 (1986). 
Sneddon claims that the broad language of the 
Dramshop Act, as well as public policy, sup-
ports extending liability to social hosts. 
Graham argues that the language of the 
statute and its legislative history indicate an 
REPORTS 
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intent to extend liability only to the commer-
cial setting. 
"Where statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond 
to divine legislative intent." Allisen v. Amer-
ican Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 
(Utah 1988). However, when the language is 
ambiguous, we may attempt to discern the 
intention of the legislature. P.I.E. Employees 
Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 
1151 (Utah 1988). "A statute is ambiguous if it 
can be understood by reasonably well-
informed persons to have different meanings." 
Tanner, 799 P.2d at 233. While Sneddon urges 
us to find to the contrary, because several of 
the terms utilized in the Dramshop Act are 
defined elsewhere in the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-1 to-
17 (1986), we hold that section 32A-14-1(1) 
is not ambiguous. 
For example, "person" is defined as "any 
individual, partnership, firm, corporation, 
association, business trust, or other form of 
business enterprise, including a receiver or 
trustee, and the plural as well as the singular 
number, unless the intent to give a more 
limited meaning is disclosed by the context." 
Section 32A-l-5(27). "Liquor" is defined to 
specifically exclude any beverage defined as a 
beer "that has an alcohol content of less than 
4% alcohol by volume," section 32A-1-
5(17), while "alcoholic beverages" "means 
'beer' and 'liquor* as the terms are defined 
in this sect ion." Section 32A-1-5(1). 
"Premises" is defined as "any building, encl-
osure, room, or equipment used in connection 
with the sale, storage, service, manufacture, 
distribution, or consumption of alcoholic 
products, unless otherwise defined in this title 
or in the rules adopted by the commission." 
Section 32A-1-5(29). 
When the principal provisions of the Dra-
mshop Act are read in context with the defi-
nitions provided by that Act, it is not ambig-
uous. The statutes plain language explicitly 
limits liability to persons who provide alcoh-
olic beverages "at a location allowing consu-
mption on the premises!.]" Conspicuously 
absent from the definition of "premises" is the 
word "house" or "private residence." See 
section 32A-l-5(29).i 
We decline to accept Sneddon's arguments, 
and affirm the trial court's legal conclusion 
that the Dramshop Act does not apply to 
individuals in a noncommercial social setting. 
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on 
a motion to amend a complaint absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Girard v. Appleby, 660 
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah 
Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure allows for amendment of a complaint 
once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar, 
he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. 
In denying Sneddon's motion to amend, the 
trial court stated: 
The court having previously granted 
Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and having entered 
summary judgment dated November 
3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of 
the plaintiff with prejudice, the 
plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend 
Complaint to "add a cause of 
act ion against the defendant , 
Robert Graham, based upon a 
theory of common law negligence in 
supplying intoxicating liquor to the 
codefendant, John Wenlcel." 
Having reviewed the motion, and 
the memorandum in opposition to 
the same, and having heard the 
argument of counsel together with 
the procedural posture of the case, 
with the court having previously 
dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, 
and the court having indicated at 
the time of hearing that if it is 
deemed appropriate at the proced-
ural juncture of this case to move 
to amend the complaint, the court 
is of the opinion that there is not a 
common law cause of act ion 
running in favor of a person injured 
against a person who supplied 
alcohol, nor does the court believe 
that the provisions of Utah's Alc-
oholic Beverage Control Act affords 
a plaintiff a cause of action under 
the facts and circumstances of this 
case 
It is unclear whether the trial court denied 
Sneddon's motion because it felt it was inap-
propriate given the procedural posture of the 
case, because it had no jurisdiction to amend a 
complaint that had been dismissed by 
summary judgment, or, as Sneddon contends, 
because the court was of the opinion that a 
common iaw negligence cause of action could 
not be raised given the facts of the case. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
- , Sneddon v 
12 175 Utah A< 
A. Timeliness of Sneddon's Motion to Amend 
Graham argues that the trial court properly 
denied Sneddon's motion to amend her com-
plaint because of the age of the initial comp-
laint, the development of discovery, the dis-
missal of Sneddon's claim against Graham, 
and the potential prejudice to Graham. 
"In considering a motion to amend, the trial 
judge must decide 'whether the opposing side 
would be put to unfavorable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which he had 
not time to prepare."' Kelly, 746 P.2d at 1190 
(quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 
P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). In Kelly, the 
plaintiff sought to add two defendants more 
than three years after the case was initiated. 
This court concluded the trial court acted 
within its discretion in denying the plaintiffs 
motion to amend her complaint, reasoning 
that it was unfair to expect the defendants to 
be prepared to defend an additional action at 
such a late date. See also Westley v. Farmer's 
Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983) (per 
curiam) (since amendment to complaint would 
have delayed trial and substance of new alle-
gation was known to plaintiff a full year 
earlier, no abuse in denying motion). 
In the present case, Sneddon sought to 
amend her complaint more than two years 
after the filing of her original complaint. The 
trial court had already granted her leave to 
add Graham as a party after the action was 
filed. When Sneddon again moved the court 
for permission to amend, the case was set for 
trial later that month. We believe that it would 
almost certainly be prejudicial to Graham to 
allow Sneddon to amend her complaint to add 
an entirely new cause of action at such a late 
date, in the course of the proceedings. Acco-
rdingly, we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Sneddon's 
motion. 
B. The Order of Dismissal as to Graham as a 
Final Adjudication 
As to whether the trial court had jurisdic-
tion to entertain Sneddon's motion to amend, 
Sneddon argues that the summary judgment in 
favor of Graham did not become a final jud-
gment until the court entered its order denying 
Sneddon's motion to amend her complaint, 
on April 16, 1990. Sneddon incorrectly argues 
that if the dismissal of her claims against 
Graham was not a final order so as to permit 
appeal, then it was not a final order so as to 
prevent the trial court from granting leave to 
amend her complaint. 
An order that does not wholly dispose of a 
claim or a party is not final, and therefore not 
appealable. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 
P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family 
Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1159 
(Utah App. 1988). A trial court's granting of 
a motion for summary judgment which does 
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not dispose of all claims of all parties, and 
which has not been certified as a final judg-
ment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is not a final judgment for 
purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Steck v. 
Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990) (per 
curiam). Rule 54(b) states: 
When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form 
of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order 
or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabi-
lities of all the parties. 
As Sneddon asserts, the dismissal of her 
claim as to Graham did not wholly dispose of 
her case. There were still claims pending 
against Wenkel. Therefore, while the supreme 
court may not have had jurisdiction to enter-
tain an appeal where the trial court had not 
entered a final judgment as to both Graham 
and Wenkel, see, e.g., A.J. Mackay Co. v. 
Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 
1991); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm% 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991), 
the trial court continued to have jurisdiction 
until all claims had been settled. The trial 
court had jurisdiction to rule on Sneddon's 
motion to amend her complaint, and it exer-
cised that jurisdiction in denying the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, both the trial 
court's grant of Graham's motion for 
summary judgment, and the denial of 
Sneddon's motion to amend her complaint, 
are affirmed.2 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Sneddon urges us to overlook this omission, 
arguing that the legislative history of the Dramshop 
Act indicates it was intended possession and use of 
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alcohol in a social setting as well. We disagree. 
The legislative history of the Dramshop Act 
underscores this interpretation. The original Dram-
shop Act statute, added to the Intoxicating Liquor 
Code in 1981, imposed liability upon any person 
who "gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating 
liquor to another, contrary to subsection 16-6-
13.1(8)(d), subsection 32-l-36.5(l)(l), section 32-
7-14 or subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c) ...." Utah 
Code Ann. §32-11-1 (Supp. 1981) (repealed 
1985). The sections referred to in the statute prov-
ided for the imposition of liability upon persons 
supplying alcohol to "any person under or appare-
ntly under the influence of liquor,* Utah Code Ann. 
§32-7-14 (1966) (repealed 1985), or upon persons 
who "permit drunkenness to take place in any house 
or on any premises of which he is the owner, tenant 
or occupant; or (b) permit or suffer any person 
apparently under the influence of liquor to consume 
any liquor in any house or on any premises^) ...." 
Utah Code Ann. §32-7-24(a)-(b) (1966) 
(emphasis added) (repealed 1985). 
In 1985, Title 32, Intoxicating Liquors, was rep-
ealed and replaced by Title 32A, the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act. An amended version of the 
Dramshop Act was enacted and codified as §32A-
14-1 (1986), and amended versions of §§32-7-
14 and 32-7-24 were enacted and codified as 
§§32A-12-9 and 32A-12-21 (1986). The 
amended Dramshop Act makes no reference to 
other sections of the Alcoholic Beverage Code. 
Instead, the prohibited acts are included in the 
Dramshop Act statute itself. The words "house, * or 
"private residence" do not appear in any of the 
amended statutes. Only the word "premises* appears 
in §§32A-12-21 and 32A-14-1. 
2. Sneddon also urges us to recognize a common 
law action of negligence in the context of a social 
host, an issue which had not been addressed in the 
courts of this state to date. However, we note the 
Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §315, which states that no duty 
can be found to protect another from harm unless 
and until a special relationship exists between the 
parties. See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 
413 (Utah 1986) (supreme court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff 
failed to show affirmative duty existed on part of 
defendant to protect plaintiff from harm). No such 
relationship has been established between Sneddon 
and Graham. 
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OPINION 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
This is a consolidated appeal by defendants 
Douglas R. Morck and Arthur J. Hobbs of 
their convictions of taking or possessing pro-
tected wildlife without a proper permit, a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §23-20-3 (1984). They argue that the 
trial court erred in denying their motion to 
suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless 
search of their truck. They contend that the 
search violated their rights under Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 23, 1990, the Division of Wildlife 
Services (DWS) received a phone call from a 
confidential informant alleging that defendants 
were going to the Book Cliffs area, near the 
Ute Indian reservation in Southern Utah, to 
hunt bear without a valid permit for that area. 
The informant stated that defendants planned 
to gain access to the Ute Indian reservation 
posing as fishermen. The informant also stated 
that defendants would be camped on the rim 
between Flatnose, George Canyon and Weaver 
Reservoir. One of the DWS officers knew 
from personal experience that both defendants 
had hunted bear in the Book Cliffs in the 
past. He also confirmed that defendants did 
not have valid hunting permits for that area, 
but did have bear hunting permits for other 
undersubscribed areas of the state. 
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